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Abstract. There is evidence that productivity in Australia’s broadacre agriculture (extensive cropping and 
livestock industries) has been slowing in the past decade. A series of poor seasons has been partly 
responsible, but an econometric analysis of structural changes in the trend of total factor productivity (TFP) 
indicates that stagnant public investment in agricultural R&D has also made a significant contribution to this 
slowdown in TFP. Related econometric analysis of the returns to public investment in agricultural R&D in the 
broadacre sector confirms that the rate of return to investment remains high. Despite these findings, a 
recent enquiry by Australia’s Productivity Commission into the financing of rural research suggests that the 
public sector may be ‘crowding out’ private sector investment in agricultural R&D and recommends a 
reduction in public support. In this paper I briefly review the econometric analyses to date and the trends in 
TFP and public R&D investment. While I have not been able to conclusively test the ‘crowding out’ 
hypothesis, there seems to be little empirical evidence to prefer this hypothesis to a more traditional 
‘market failure’ hypothesis. Clearly, stakeholders in agricultural R&D in Australia have to do a better job in 
communicating the case for public investment in agricultural R&D. Other developed countries are 
experiencing the same phenomenon and it may become an issue in the future for developing countries in 
Asia.    
Keywords: total factor productivity, returns to research, crowding out. 
Introduction 
Agricultural R&D can be thought of as adding 
to a knowledge stock that has an impact on 
productivity for 35 or more years. This is an 
important source of wealth in countries 
making these investments. Moreover, new 
technologies developed in rich countries able 
to make the largest investments have ‘spilled 
over’ to poor countries and hence public R&D 
has been an important source of wealth and 
poverty alleviation across the world. The 
need for continued productivity growth is 
evident with world population still to grow by 
another 2-3 billion and the challenges for 
productivity from climate change to be met in 
coming decades.  
Despite these challenges, public investment 
in agricultural R&D is under threat in many 
developed countries (Pardey et al. 2006). 
Moreover, evidence is also emerging of a 
slowdown in productivity growth in 
agriculture in at least some rich countries, 
likely in part as a consequence of a slowdown 
in R&D investment.   
The continuing unresolved controversy about 
the role of government in funding agricultural 
research in Australia is evidenced by the four 
enquiries held by the Productivity 
Commission (PC) (or its forebears) since 
1976.  The Productivity Commission has 
usually recommended that the maximum 
government grant matching the levies 
collected by the Research and Development 
Corporations (RDCs) be reduced from its 
present level of 0.5% of the gross value of 
the relevant industries. One reason for this 
recommendation is that the PC argues that 
public support to agricultural R&D far exceeds 
that to other industries. The extent of this 
‘excess’ support is disputed in submissions to 
the 2011 PC enquiry by the Australian Farm 
Institute and ABARES, for example, but this 
argument is not pursued here. The PC also 
argued that were the grant to be reduced, 
the RDCs would make up any shortfall by 
increasing their levy rates. This is a variant of 
the hypothesis that government investment 
is ‘crowding out’ industry investment.  
The 2011 Inquiry followed past inquiries in 
recommending a halving of the cap for a 
matching grant to 0.25% of industry Gross 
Value of Production (GVP) over ten years. A 
notable departure from previous inquiries 
was the recommendation for an uncapped 
contribution of 20 cents for every $1 raised 
from industry beyond the cap for the 
matching grant, thus providing industry with 
an ongoing incentive to increase investment 
in R&D.    
The alternative view presented to the PC 
enquiries is that the public good 
characteristics of R&D give rise to socially 
suboptimal levels of investment by industry 
and this market failure requires some 
continuing public investment, even in R&D, 
delivering benefits largely to industry1. The 
development of the RDC model has 
                                       
* I have benefited from insights (and data) from 
colleagues at ABARES and from those who 
attended seminars at the SA Branch of AARES and 
James Cook University, Townsville.  
1 There seems little argument that there is likely to 
be market failure in the provision of research 
service related to environmental and social 
outcomes although there is a naive argument held 
by some that where community benefits are jointly 
provided by, say, RDC supported research, no 
further investment is required by the public sector. 
to capture these outcomes for the community.  




ameliorated but not solved the market failure 
problem.   
My purpose here is to assess the extent to 
which the limited empirical evidence about 
the relationship between investment in R&D 
and productivity growth supports (or not) 
these competing hypotheses about the role of 
government in funding agricultural R&D. First 
there are brief reviews of trends in public 
investment in agricultural research in 
Australia and in productivity in Australian 
broadacre agriculture. Then follows reviews 
of econometric work first, linking the 
slowdown in productivity growth with the 
slowdown in public investment and climate 
and second, estimating the rate of return to 
public investment in R&D in broadacre 
agriculture in Australia. Finally, I discuss how 
consistent this empirical evidence is with the 
‘crowding out’ and ‘market failure’ 
hypotheses. 
Trends in public investment in 
agriculture in Australia  
The way in which the data on R&D 
investment have been assembled from ABS 
sources and from a previous dataset 
developed by Mullen et al. (1996) is 
described in Mullen (2007). Expenditure is 
attributed to research providers, rather than 
funders. As a result, expenditure by state 
departments of agriculture or universities, for 
example, includes funds obtained from rural 
RDCs. Attention is focussed on farm 
production research and investment. R&D in 
fisheries and forestry, in environment and 
social outcomes and in the processing of farm 
products is not included. The GDP deflator 
was used to express investment in R&D in 
2008 dollars.  
Total public expenditure on agricultural R&D 
in Australia has grown from A$140 million in 
1952-53 to almost A$830 million in 2006-07 
(in 2008 dollars) (Figure 1) (Mullen 2010a). 
Expenditure growth was strong to the mid-
1970s, but has essentially been static since 
that time although there was a spike in 
investment (nearly A$950 million) in 2001. 
Likewise, agricultural research intensity, 
which measures the investment in 
agricultural R&D as a percentage of GDP, 
grew strongly in the 1950s and 1960s, but 
has been drifting down from about 4.0-5.0% 
annually of agriculture GDP in the period 
between 1978 and 1986 to about 3.0% per 
annum in recent years (as compared to 2.4% 
per annum in developed countries).  
A feature of the agricultural research sector 
in Australia has been the prominent role 
played by the RDCs. In approximate terms, 
RDCs commission agricultural research on a 
competitive basis among public and private 
research providers using funds from levies on 
production and matching Commonwealth 
grants (up to 0.5% of the value of 
production). The attraction of the RDC 
system is that it ameliorates the non-
excludability characteristic of information 
generated by research, while preserving the 
benefits from its non-rival nature.  In 2007, 
total expenditure by the RDCs on production 
agricultural research (excluding the fisheries, 
forestry and energy RDCs and Land and 
Water Australia (LWA) was A$478 million 
($2008), which is almost 60% of total public 
expenditure on agricultural R&D. Some of 
this investment by the RDCs is directed 
towards the processing sectors rather than 
production agriculture and some is directed 
to environmental outcomes. If these 
investments outside production agriculture 
amount to a third of the total then it seems 
likely that the RDCs are funding 40 – 50% of 
research into production agriculture in 
Australia. Recall also that over half of these 
RDC funds are raised from farmers. In the 
1980s, RDC funding amounted to less than 
15% of total public expenditure on 
agricultural R&D. 
Productivity growth in Australian 
broadacre agriculture 
The estimates of productivity growth in 
Australian broadacre agriculture used here 
were based on farm survey data from the 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE). A more 
thorough review of the trend in agricultural 
productivity in Australia and its estimation 
can be found in Nossal et al. (2010).  
Productivity growth is measured as the 
growth in outputs less the growth in inputs2. 
Starting from 100 back to 1952-53, the 
estimated multifactor (MFP) index increased 
to 218.3 in 2006-07 with the annual growth 
rate of 2.0% a year (Figure 2).  The index is 
highly variable, falling in 20 of the 55 years, 
reflecting seasonal conditions. Such 
variability makes it difficult to discern trends 
in the underlying, more stable rate of 
technological change. 
Changes in productivity can be compared 
with changes in the terms of trade faced by 
farmers3 as a partial indicator of whether 
Australian agriculture is becoming more or 
less competitive. The conventional wisdom is 
that the terms of trade facing Australian 
agriculture have been declining inexorably. 
                                       
2 The terms multifactor productivity (MFP) and total 
factor productivity (TFP) are used equivalently. The 
former term recognises that in practice not all 
factors can be measured and included in the index.  
3 Reported in ABARE (2008) and estimated as the 
ratio of an index of prices received by farmers to 
an index of prices paid by farmers.  




The real situation was a decline of 2.6% per 
annum from 1953 to 1990, and less than 1% 
per annum from 1991 to 2007. 
A better indication of ‘competitiveness’ is the 
growth in productivity in agriculture relative 
to that in the rest of the economy. Mullen 
(2010b) reported ABS data suggesting that in 
recent decades productivity in the 
agriculture, fisheries and forestry sector often 
grew at three times the rate of that in the 
rest of the economy4. The agricultural sectors 
in few other OECD countries have performed 
as well. Hence, productivity growth in the 
Australian agricultural sector has likely been 
strong enough to enhance the sector’s 
competitiveness relative to other sectors of 
the economy and relative to the agricultural 
sectors in many other countries. 
The ABARE broadacre dataset can be 
stratified to provide estimates of productivity 
growth by the enterprise or industry: 
cropping, mixed crop–livestock, beef, and 
sheep. Since 1978, cropping specialists have 
achieved much higher rates of MFP growth 
(2.1% per year) than have beef specialists 
(1.5% per year) and sheep specialists (0.3% 
per year) (Table 1) (Nossal et al. 2010). 
Generally output grew while input use stayed 
static or declined. In particular, cropping 
specialists greatly increased their use of 
purchased inputs (4% per year) and reduced 
their use of labour (-0.2% per year) and 
capital (-0.4% per year). A switch toward 
reduced-tillage cropping—which is also 
associated with more diverse cropping 
rotations and more opportunistic cropping to 
exploit available soil moisture (as opposed to 
fixed rotations and fallows)—partly explains 
the changes in input use and the strong rate 
of productivity growth.  
However, recent data suggest that 
productivity growth in Australian agriculture 
– and that of other developed countries 
(Pardey et al. 2006) – has slowed in the 10 
years leading up to 2007. From 1998 to 2007 
productivity fell at the rate of 1.4% per 
annum (Table 1). Trends in productivity have 
not been even across industries within 
broadacre agriculture (Table 1). For cropping 
specialists, MFP grew by 4.8% per year from 
1980 to 1994 but declined by 2.1% per year 
from 1998 to 2007. There seems much less 
evidence of a slowing in MFP growth for beef 
and sheep specialists. Nossal et al. (2010) 
speculated that productivity growth of sheep 
specialists, usually ranking the lowest among 
the industry groups, might finally be catching 
up.  
                                       
4 Mullen (2010a, b) explained difference in 
the ABARE and ABS MFP series for Australia.  
Why might broadacre productivity be 
slowing?  
Some argue that it is not surprising that 
productivity growth in agriculture is drifting 
down because “all the big gains have been 
made.” However, Australian research 
agronomists seem confident that there are 
still practical research opportunities to 
develop new technologies that would allow 
farmers to grow crops more efficiently. 
Anderson and Angus (World Wheat Book, in 
press) said: “Despite the new technology, the 
mean yield is only 2.0 tons per ha, about half 
of the water-limited potential…. Further 
research will be needed to increase yield 
closer to the water-limited potential. The 
gains are most likely to come from tactics 
that enable crops to take advantage of the 
more favorable seasons in the variable 
climate, and concentration of inputs on the 
parts of farms with the highest yield 
potential.”  
Another factor likely to explain a significant 
portion of productivity growth in broadacre 
agriculture (at least at the aggregate level) is 
climate or seasonal conditions. No doubt 
some of the recent productivity decline is due 
to the run of poor seasons shown by the 
rainfall anomaly5 for the Murray Darling Basin 
from 2000-2008 (Figure 3), but recent 
research by Sheng et al. (2010) has 
demonstrated that the stagnation in public 
investment in R&D from the late 70s is now 
also contributing to the slowdown in MFP. 
Econometric analyses of the relationship 
between public investment in Australian 
broadacre agriculture and productivity 
growth in broadacre agriculture 
Two approaches have recently been applied 
to examine the relationship between 
productivity growth and public investment in 
research in broadacre agriculture in Australia. 
One approach used time series techniques to 
assess whether there have been changes in 
the trend in broadacre productivity and, if so, 
what factors might explain any trend 
changes. The second approach updates 
traditional regression analyses of the factors 
including public investment in R&D and 
productivity growth and goes on to estimate 
a return to investment.  
Analysis of the Trend in Broadacre 
Productivity 
Sheng et al. (2010) tested whether 
Australian broadacre productivity growth had 
slowed and, if so, when and why. TFP is 
highly variable due, in part, to unstable 
                                       
5 The anomaly is the annual deviation in rainfall 
from average annual rainfall between 1961 and 
1990. 




seasonal effects. Therefore, detecting 
fundamental shifts in the long-term trend 
required suitable statistical methods.  An 
analysis of recursive residuals from 
regression models (the CUSQ method) was 
used to examine the systematic deviation 
from trend in current total factor productivity 
(TFP) in Australian broadacre agriculture 
between 1952-53 and 2006-07. They found 
that a significant structural change or ‘turning 
point’ occurred in the TFP series in the mid-
1990s. Further, it was likely that the 
slowdown was likely due to a combination of 
adverse seasonal conditions and stagnant 
public R&D expenditure since the late 1970s.  
The rate of return to public investment in 
broadacre agricultural research 
Mullen and Cox (1995) conducted the original 
econometric analysis of the relationship 
between public investment in research and 
productivity growth in Australia’s broadacre 
agriculture. Using a dataset extending from 
1953 to 1994 they estimated that the rate of 
return to research was in the range of 15 – 
40%. This original study was updated on 
several occasions (Mullen 2007) but the most 
comprehensive revision using a dataset 
extending to 2007 and an exhaustive 
estimation strategy based on Alston et al. 
(2010) was reported in Sheng et al. (2011).  










where TS is a stock of knowledge available to 
farmers generated by research, EXT is 
another knowledge stock variable this time 
generated by extension activities. Control 
variables include a measure of seasonal 
conditions (WEAt) farmer’s level of education 
attainment as a proxy for the unobserved 
human capital of broadacre farmers (EDUCt) 
and the farmers’ terms of trade for Australian 
agriculture (TOTt).  
Estimating models of this nature require 
consideration of a wide range of specification 
issues. Economic theory is not prescriptive 
with respect to these issues. Following in the 
spirit of Alston et al. (2010) but not as 
exhaustively, Sheng et al. (2011) conducted 
an extensive econometric analysis over a 
range of specification issues to identify a set 
of models with good econometric properties 
with a view to assessing how robust were 
findings with respect to rates of return to 
investment. 
Ideally the focus of such empirical work 
should be the relationship between R&D and 
the technical change component of TFP. 
Other components of TFP are technical, scale 
and mix efficiencies (O’Donnell 2010). 
Investment in extension accounts for 
technical efficiency but no account is taken in 
this model of gains in TFP from scale 
efficiency (Hughes et al. 2011).  
A key issue is the derivation of knowledge 
stocks generated by R&D. They are normally 
derived as weighted averages of a past 
stream of annual investments. The weights 
depend on the length and shape of the 
distribution function used to define the 
impact of R&D through time on the 
knowledge stock.  Sheng et al. considered 
five distribution functions for lag lengths of 
16 and 35 years and a key property in 
discriminating between models was their root 
mean square error (RMSE). The distributions 
they considered were (see Figure 4): 
• ‘Trapezoid’ used previously by Mullen with 
peak impact in years 9 -15; 
• ‘Gamma’ with peak impact at 7 years;  
• ‘Gamma_T’ with peak impact at 13 years 
similar to the Trapezoid; 
•  ‘Pim’ the permanent inventory method 
used in studies of industrial R&D at 
depreciation rate of 15 per cent from peak 
impact in year 1.  
• ‘Gamma_P’ mimicking ‘Pim’. 
The distribution preferred by Sheng et al. was 
the unconstrained gamma model (even 
though the peak of research impact in year 7 
is somewhat counterintuitive). However the 
Gamma T and Trapezoid models also had 
good econometric properties. They found the 
16-year lag models had poor properties for 
all distributions. 
Other key choices involved the treatment of 
private investment in broadacre R&D and 
foreign research activities that impact on 
productivity in Australian broadacre 
agriculture. Sheng et al. (2011) followed 
Mullen and Cox (1995) in omitting Australian 
private agricultural R&D largely because until 
recent years it has been very small relative to 
public investment and higher levels of 
investment in recent years are unlikely to 
have yet had much impact on productivity.  
An important contribution of Sheng et al. is 
that they have successfully incorporated the 
influence of foreign research activities in their 
model. Problems with multicollinearity meant 
that the separate influences of the Australian 
public and US public knowledge stocks could 
not be estimated, but the model above, 
where the TS knowledge stock is the 
weighted sum of the two knowledge stocks 
(where the weight on the US stock was 0.1), 
was preferred to the original Mullen and Cox 
model which ignored foreign ‘spilling’.  
Other specification and estimation issues 
included choices about: 




• Linear v log-linear v quadratic functional 
forms; 
• OLS v ARIMA estimators. 
A log-linear functional form and the ARIMA 
estimator were preferred. 
Sheng et al. (2011) preferred the model 
where domestic and foreign public knowledge 
stocks were incorporated in TS derived from 
an unconstrained gamma distribution over 35 
years estimated in log-linear form using an 
ARIMA estimator. From this model the 
estimated internal rate of return to a one- 
year increment in Australian public 
investment in R&D was 28.4%. Two 
counterintuitive aspects of this model are 
that peak research impact occurs around 
year 7 and that foreign ‘spillins’ contributed 
twice as much to broadacre productivity 
gains as domestic public R&D. The models 
based on the ‘Gamma_T’ and the Trapezoid 
distributions impose a peak impact in later 
years. Their results suggest that the influence 
of foreign and domestic R&D is similar and 
give estimated IRRs of 14% and 15.4%, 
respectively. The IRRs for the Mullen and Cox 
model ignoring foreign R&D were a few 
percentage points lower for each distribution 
type. The IRRs for models where research 
lags were constrained to 16 years were much 
larger. Sheng et al. found that when 
estimated over the shorter period since 1978 
the returns to research increased (to 45.3% 
for their preferred Gamma model). 
Hence, the Sheng et al. (2011) findings are 
consistent with previous econometric studies 
by Mullen (summarised in Mullen 2007) of 
public investment in broadacre agriculture in 
Australia. They are also consistent with the 
many reputable benefit cost analyses at a 
project level conducted in Australia by State 
Departments of Agriculture and by private 
consultants for the RDCs.  
Mullen (2004 and extended in later seminars) 
reported that the average Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(BCR) for 10 large projects evaluated by 
NSW DPI economists in 2003 and 2004 was 
11.2:1 (ranging from 2 to 66:1). DAFF 
(2001) reported that Chudleigh and Simpson 
(2001) had found that the average BCR for a 
sample of projects across several of the RDCs 
was 7:1. Council of the Rural Research and 
Development Corporations (2010) in 
reviewing the PC (2007) report into Public 
Support for Science and Innovation identified 
41 benefit cost analyses for rural R&D 
projects spanning a broad array of industries 
and types of research.  A simple average of 
these results shows a BCR of 68.5. He also 
summarised evaluations commissioned by 
the Council of the RDCs in 2008 and 2009. 
He found that when benefits (excluding 
unpriced environmental benefits) were 
estimated over 25 years, the average BCR 
was about 11:1 for about 90 randomly 
selected projects. Much of this material is 
referenced in the recent report from the 
Productivity Commission (2011). 
Goucher also reviewed the study by Alston et 
al. (2000) of rates of return analyses 
worldwide. Alston et al. found that the 
average of the estimates of the rate of return 
to research only (from 1,144 studies) was 
100% per annum.  The range was wide, but 
less than 10 estimates (less than 1%) found 
a negative rate of return. Goucher 
summarised the findings from the 154 
Australian and NZ studies reviewed by Alston 
et al. The average estimated rate of return 
from these studies was 87% p.a.  
The broad conclusion from this substantial 
body of economic analysis of investment in 
publicly funded agricultural R&D both globally 
and in Australia is that returns are very high 
and this suggests that there may be a degree 
of underinvestment in agricultural research in 
Australia as well as globally.  
Two further observations can be made here. 
First all the econometric analysis at an 
aggregate level and most of the project level 
benefit cost analysis focus on quantifying 
industry benefits, but ‘spillover’ benefits in 
the form of gains in environmental and 
human health and in social and scientific 
capacity are at best identified qualitatively. 
These ‘spillovers’ are widely accepted as a 
potential source of market failure requiring 
potentially some form of government 
intervention. One point of contention, 
however, is that the PC (and others) argue 
that providing industry benefits are sufficient 
there is no need for government intervention 
whereas some would argue that often, there 
is little incentive for industry to ensure that 
these ‘spillover’ benefits are actually taken up 
by the community and that some degree of 
public investment is required to ensure these 
benefits are captured by the community.  
Second, the incentives facing farmers and 
RDCs are much higher than estimated 
returns to total investment in R&D.   Let’s say 
the rate of industry returns to investment in 
R&D is 20%6. At present RDCs fund about 
half the cost of a research project, the rest 
coming as an in-kind contribution from a 
research institution (a State Department for 
example). Hence, the return to the RDC 
investment is effectively 40%. Moreover 
farmers provide half the funds to RDCs and 
so the effective return to their investment 
(attracting the matching grant) is in the order 
                                       
6 The focus is on industry returns rather than 
environmental and social returns.  




of 80%7. Reducing the matching grant will 
mean that the incentive facing farmers for 
any levy funds beyond 0.25% of GVP would 
be 40% under this scenario (or 48% if a 20 
cent per dollar invested uncapped grant is 
introduced).  
The PC accepts that the preponderance of 
evidence supports the view that return to 
investment in research in Australian 
agriculture has been high. Nevertheless the 
PC argues that the matching grant (against 
the RDC levy) should be halved to 0.25% of 
GVP because it doubts that the matching 
grant has called forth much additional 
research from industry. It expects that were 
the government to reduce the GVP cap for a 
matching grant by 0.25%, the RDCs would 
increase their levies to offset this reduction. 
The public sector is ‘crowding out’ industry 
investment in other words. 
Does the empirical evidence support the 
‘crowding out’ or ‘market failure’ 
hypotheses? 
It seems difficult (if not impossible) to 
develop a conclusive econometric test of 
either hypothesis. This is not an uncommon 
problem. The task is to see which hypothesis 
seems most consistent with limited empirical 
evidence and inferences or expectations 
based on the nature of agricultural research 
and the structure of the agricultural sector. 
Some of the following discussion is 
speculative and anecdotal but raises 
questions worthy of further research.  
Starting with the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis 
we might wonder under what conditions 
would industry, in this case RDCs, not invest 
in research in the presence of public 
investment. The PC seems to be arguing that 
the present level of matching grant is not 
attracting ‘additional’ investment by industry. 
They speculate that this research would have 
been done anyway because of the high rates 
of return being earned and hence were public 
funding withdrawn as recommended, the 
RDCs would be able (at some time lag) to 
increase levies to replace these public funds.  
There does not appear to be any historical 
precedent (of a withdrawal of government 
funding) to test this ‘crowding out’ argument 
by the PC. However if it were true, then an 
obvious question, not addressed by the PC, is 
why more RDCs have not already raised 
levies beyond 0.5% in pursuit of these high 
returns (the GRDC and AWI are the 
exceptions).  
Another more likely scenario in which 
investment by RDCs would be ‘crowded out’ 
                                       
7 Let’s assume that the incidence of levies and the 
distribution of the benefits from production 
focussed R&D are the same.  
by the public sector is one where the returns 
to their investment in research were low 
relative to other investment opportunities 
available to farmers. Under this scenario 
withdrawing public funds might result in an 
increase in the returns to research 
investment sufficient to attract increased 
investment from the RDCs (providing the 
research production function is characterised 
by diminishing returns to investment at this 
point). Under this scenario one might also 
expect it to be common that RDCs set levies 
below the maximum 0.5% matching grant 
level.  
Neither of these conditions is observed, in 
fact just the opposite. Few RDCS set levies 
below the 0.5% level and few set levies 
above this level. Further, as described above, 
the rates of return to public investment in 
research have been high for several decades.  
Perhaps the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis is 
consistent with high rates of return if either 
the research production function showed a 
high degree of diminishing returns at this 
point where levies are set at 0.5% or if a 
constraint to research such as the supply of 
scientists becomes critically binding at this 
point. The arguments are reviewed here but 
the case is difficult to make.  
In the first case the argument might run that 
RDCs are unwilling to invest beyond the 
0.5% level because their incentives are 
sharply diminished past this point, but that 
up to this point they may be prepared to 
replace public investment because the 
returns are sufficiently attractive8. There are 
no historical precedents to shed some light 
on this, but there is some empirical evidence 
about the shape of the research production 
function.  
Intuitively we would expect some degree of 
curvature but recent empirical analyses 
provide little evidence that it is strong. Sheng 
et al. (2011) estimated higher returns to 
research for a model estimated over the 
shorter time frame from 1978. Given that 
real public investment in agricultural R&D 
was at best stagnant over this period, this 
provides some circumstantial evidence of 
diminishing returns. However they also found 
that no gains in model performance could be 
had from using a quadratic functional form – 
conducive to the possibility of sharply 
diminishing returns to investment – instead 
                                       
8 Note that the returns to farmers fall to 40% 
(under the assumptions of the illustrative example 
used here) as they go beyond the 0.5% level but 
they would also fall to this level were government 
to pull back from the 0.5% level.  




of the preferred log-linear form9. It has 
already been noted that scientists are still 
confident that research opportunities remain 
to increase agricultural productivity. 
There is some concern about the supply of 
scientists with inferences of a severe 
shortage based on the age profile of the 
research community and the closure or 
amalgamation of agricultural science 
departments and faculties10. Yet there seems 
little evidence either in terms of growth in 
employment opportunities or the demand for 
university places, or in terms of rising 
salaries, of strong growth in the demand for 
agricultural scientists. Perhaps demand 
pressures will emerge in coming years.  
In summing up to date, neither empirical 
evidence nor a logical chain of inference 
provides much support for the ‘crowding out’ 
hypothesis. It is much easier to make a case 
in support of the traditional ‘market failure’ 
argument.  
Few would argue that the non-excludability 
and non-rivalry characteristics of information 
generated by research mean that were 
farmers left to act individually, investment in 
agricultural research would be suboptimal 
from the viewpoints of both agriculture and 
society more generally. In Australia the RDC 
model has been developed to ameliorate the 
non-excludability issue while preserving the 
benefits of non-rivalry. 
The debate however focuses on whether the 
RDC model is sufficient to largely solve the 
market failure problem. The PC clearly thinks 
it does, arguing, as we have seen, that in fact 
government is ‘crowding out’ industry at least 
with respect to research delivering largely 
industry benefits (although it does agree that 
some lower level of public funding is 
justified). Others argue that the high rates of 
return to research, prevailing for at least 
several decades, are evidence of continuing 
market failure. The question that then arises 
is why are RDCs unable to increase levies to 
enable industry to capture more of these high 
returns.  
It should not be surprising that farmers 
understate their true willingness to pay for 
research under the common uniform levy of 
the RDC model. Remaining incentives to ‘free 
ride’ are complemented by heterogeneity in 
the resource endowment of farms and in the 
applicability of particular technologies. In 
                                       
9 Mullen (2007) using a quadratic functional form 
found some evidence of increasing returns but this 
finding is not supported by the more recent Sheng 
et al. study.  
10 It should be noted that the people who point to 
supply constraints also point to falling public 
investment as a key cause.  
addition the long lags in the development of 
new technologies may be a disincentive to 
increasing levies. This disincentive arises not 
only because they may not receive any 
benefits in their working life, but more likely 
because they do not appreciate the 
contribution to their present farming system 
of past research efforts nor foresee how 
present research efforts may change farming 
systems decades hence. Some of these 
arguments are noted in the PC report.  
Concluding comments 
Salient features of the agricultural research 
setting in Australia are first, rates of return to 
investment have been high for several 
decades at least and second, that farmers 
through the RDCs show little inclination to 
increase the levies they pay to finance R&D 
beyond the 0.5% of GVP that has attracted a 
matching Commonwealth grant (with the 
GRDC and AWI being notable exceptions). 
The unwillingness on the part of farmers to 
increase levy contributions is likely explained 
by the non-excludable characteristic of 
research and the heterogeneity of farming 
enterprises on the one hand and the impact 
of new technology on the other.  
This set of phenomena readily fits with a 
traditional hypothesis that present levels of 
investment in research are likely to be 
suboptimal from society’s viewpoint even 
where the outcomes of research are 
predominantly economic (industry oriented) 
in nature. Public sector investment remains 
an important means to overcome this market 
failure.  
However present levels of public sector 
investment in Australia remain under threat 
with the PC again recommending that the 
Commonwealth matching grant be halved 
although the recommendation that a 20 cent 
per industry dollar uncapped grant (beyond 
the 0.25% GVP cap) be introduced seems a 
sensible change in the incentives for industry 
to invest in R&D. The PC argument is based 
partly on a contested assessment, not 
pursued here, that public support for 
agricultural research is much higher than for 
research in other sectors, and partly on a 
notion that the public sector is crowding out 
the private sector such that were the 
Commonwealth levy halved, the RDCs would 
increase the levies raised from farmers. 
However, ‘crowding out’ would most likely be 
typified by low rates of return to research 
and pressure to reduce levy rates. Observed 
high rates of return are only consistent with 
crowding out in the unlikely scenarios of 
either sharply diminishing returns to future 
research and/or constraints on the supply of 
research services. The PC provides little 




empirical evidence to support their 
recommendations.  
In Australia, as in some other developed 
countries, productivity growth in agriculture 
is slowing and a decline in public investment 
in R&D is likely to have contributed to this 
slowdown. The long lags over which R&D 
impacts on productivity exacerbate this 
attribution problem, but also mean that any 
current slowdown in public investment will 
influence productivity growth in agriculture 
for several decades at a time when global 
population is still growing and costs 
associated with climate change are emerging. 
It would seem prudent to maintain public 
support for agricultural research rather than 
risk losses in economic welfare in Australia 
and poor countries somewhat reliant on 
technologies generated in Australia on the 
basis that public investment is crowding out 
private investment; a basis that has little 
empirical support. 
The hypothesis that there remains some 
degree of underinvestment in agricultural 
research in Australia is supported by 
prevailing high rates of return to research 
investment and by a sound rationale as to 
why the RDC model cannot be expected to 
arrive at a levy on farmers fully reflective of 
the value of research to industry and society.  
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1979-80 to 1988-89 2.2% 4.8% 2.9% -0.9% 0.4%
1984-85 to 1993-94 1.8% 4.7% 3.2% 3.1% -1.7%
1988-89 to 1997-98 2.0% 1.9% 1.4% 1.6% -1.2%
1993-94 to 2002-03 0.7% -1.2% 0.0% 1.0% 3.4%
1997-98 to 2006-07 -1.4% -2.1% -1.9% 2.8% 0.5%
1977-78 to 2006-07 1.5% 2.1% 1.5% 1.5% 0.3%




Figure 1: Real public investment in agricultural R&D in Australia 
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